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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been noted that there is something unusual about the 
way Americans think about political corruption.3  Americans are 
substantially more likely than citizens of other Western 
democracies to claim that their government is corrupt,4 yet they 
are slightly less likely than residents of similar countries to claim 
any firsthand experience with corruption.5  This is a disparity that 
merits our concern: do Americans harbor a paranoid streak, or a 
healthy skepticism about government?  Or do we simply think 
about corruption differently than do the citizens of other nations?  
And what consequences does this disparity have for governance?  
Bruce Cain argues convincingly that this disparity has its roots in 
the artificial discussion that has been prompted by our Supreme 
Court;6 forced to accept that preventing corruption is the sole 
constitutionally permissible rationale for regulating political 
spending, proponents of campaign finance reform have looked for 
corruption everywhere, and in the process have twisted the word 
so that it embraces a wide range of political and social phenomena 
that other nations’ citizens might not regard as corrupt.7 
Cain’s allegations are of particular relevance in today’s political 
climate.8  Although we lack empirical evidence to prove this point,9 
it seems apparent to us that there has been an increase over the 
past few years in talk of corruption in American politics.10  Much of 
 
3 See generally 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP 
(Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-
corruption.aspx (discussing perceptions of adults who view corruption as 
pervasive over the past decade). 
4 See generally William Tate, Gallup CEO: Belief that Current Government is 
Corrupt Fuels Trump Popularity, AM. THINKER (Jan. 9, 2016), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/01/gallup_ceo_belief_that_current_g
overnment_is_corrupt_fuels_trump_popularity.html (comparing the seventy-five 
of the American public that believe their government is corrupt in comparison to 
other Western democracies). 
5 See generally LESLIE HOLMES, CORRUPTION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 78 
(Oxford University Press, 1st ed. 2015) (discussing comparative levels of 
corruption between countries in North-Western Europe than those is South-
Eastern Europe). 
6  See generally BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S  
POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 166 (Cambridge University Press 2015) (discussing 
strategies to prevent corruption and achieve political equality). 
7 See id. at 165–66. 
8 See generally id. at 161 (discussing recent politics involving Hillary Clinton). 
9 See generally id. at 2 (discussing examples of how political corruption is only 
perceived in a particular way). 
10 See generally id. (discussing how Americans have ranked public officials as 
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this increase is due to the two related efforts: the establishment of 
a research program on corruption undertaken by Harvard 
University’s Edmond J. Safra Center on Ethics from 2009 to 2014,11 
and the effort by legal scholars to develop a more expansive 
definition of corruption12 so as to respond to the narrow quid pro 
quo definition at the heart of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United 
v. FEC decision.13  Perhaps because the Court has highlighted the 
threat of corruption, both of these efforts, though largely led by 
lawyers and legal scholars, seem to aim to expose types of alleged 
corruption not captured by the word in its narrower legal or 
criminal senses.14  At the same time, they implicitly assimilate 
these other phenomena to criminal corruption, and the new, 
broader sense of corruption seems to draw on the connotations of 
the legal or criminal sense of corruption.15 
Richard Briffault suggests that these efforts aim to 
“dejudicialize” political finance—to reclaim from the courts a 
degree of democratic control over our politics and to bring our 
politics in line with the norms and values expressed in the 
Constitution.16  Political finance is certainly not the only arena of 
political contestation where this has been said to be a problem,17 
but it provides a useful starting point.  It may make sense for legal 
 
negatively as car salesmen in recent years). 
11 About, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS, 
http://ethics.harvard.edu/pages/about (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Arthur 
Applbaum, Lawrence Lessig Appointed New Center Director, EDMOND J. SAFRA 
CTR. FOR ETHICS (Mar. 9, 2009), http://ethics.harvard.edu/news/lawrence-lessig-
appointed-new-center-director; New E-Books from Edmond J. Safra Research 
Lab, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS (June 30, 2015), 
http://ethics.harvard.edu/news/new-e-books-edmond-j-safra-research-lab. 
12 See generally CAIN, supra note 6, at 2, 164 (discussing the number of recent 
books published on the topic of American politics and corruption and the different 
definitions that corruption has been given). 
13 See generally id. at 163 (discussing how the case mentioned is restrictive and 
how campaign finance restricts material corruption). 
14 See generally id. at 164 (discussing and distinguishing two types of 
corruption between democratic distortion and material corruption). 
15 See generally id. at 162–63 (discussing bribery and extortion as forms of 
material corruption). 
16 See Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 
in MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED 175 
(Monica Youn ed., 2011). 
17 Consider, for instance, the meaning of the “well-regulated militia” of the 
Second Amendment, the ongoing debate over whether the constitution grants, 
without using the word, a right to privacy, or whether the “state” as specified in 
the tenth amendment, should be construed as the state government or the people 
of a state.  U.S. CONST. amend. II; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
See generally Briffault, supra note 16, at 174 (discussing the Constitution). 
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scholars to use legal language in talking about such matters, but 
it strikes us—a social scientist and a philosopher—as a bit odd to 
adopt legal language if one wishes to wrest this particular 
conversation away from the lawyers.  If corruption is indeed a 
serious problem in contemporary politics,18 we should talk about it 
the way we want to talk amongst ourselves about it—we shouldn’t 
just talk to the current or future Supreme Court about it.  If, on 
the other hand, there’s something else bothering us, we should call 
that something by its proper name. 
This article is our contribution to talking about how we should 
talk about corruption: how Americans can have an honest 
conversation about it, and how some of the more peculiar aspects 
of the American conversation of late can be reconciled with the way 
in which it has been discussed in other places and other times.19  
We are not writing this as a defense of the Supreme Court’s stance 
on corruption, nor are we seeking to challenge or justify any 
particular set of regulations on political finance.  We do, however, 
wish to take seriously this “corruption talk,” or what John C. 
Coates refers to as “the New New Corruption.”20  The two 
endeavors we note above are linked in that the latter proposes to 
broaden the definition of corruption for an immediate political 
end,21 and the former proposes to apply the findings of a research 
program on corruption in one sphere of society—elections22—and 
broaden the definitions therein to include areas such as corporate 
support for scientific research, banking laws, and other activities 
that are not strictly governmental.23  If one wishes to broaden a 
term, it is natural to look beyond the phenomena that prompted 
this course of action, as a means of legitimating the enterprise to 
one’s self and others.24  While there are clearly many rotten things 
 
18 See generally CAIN, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing examples of published 
materials that support the proposition that there is a current problem in 
American politics). 
19 See infra notes 179–337 and accompanying text. 
20 See John C. Coates, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, 
Data, and Implications 31 (Feb. 27, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
Harvard University Law School). 
21 See generally id. at 33 (discussing some definitions of corruption that achieve 
political influence).   
22 See generally id. at 32 (quoting Justice Kennedy in an opinion discussing 
how elected officials can succumb to corruption as a result of improper influences).  
23 See generally id. at 33, 38–39 (discussing how the court’s definition of 
corruption is too narrow). 
24 See generally id. at 33 (discussing a theoretical approach to broaden the 
definition of corruption through having a vision).  
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afoot in United States and the rest of the world the idea that a 
word can simply be redefined to advance one’s goals is, as we shall 
argue, problematic.  Perhaps the Court has left reform advocates 
no alternative rhetorical strategy here,25 but to assert this merely 
shifts the blame; it does not mitigate the consequences. 
This is so because corruption, as a term, has three important 
qualities.  First, corruption is a loaded word.26  Although, as we 
discuss below, we disagree with some elements of Laura 
Underkuffler’s argument,27 we agree with her that to call someone 
corrupt is to make a categorical, moral statement about that 
person’s character.28  Underkuffler finds this to be problematic in 
a legal sense—it is a moral term, she says, that is ill suited to a 
system that evaluates actions, not character.29  We are more 
concerned with the political or rhetorical ramifications of 
corruption.  To label someone corrupt is to delegitimize that 
person’s actions, goals, or political views.30  It is perhaps more 
delegitimizing than to accuse one of racism, sexism, or any other 
“ism,” insofar as these “isms” presuppose a value structure, even if 
it is a wrong or morally objectionable one.31  Or to put matters in 
other terms, one might atone for one’s past racist or sexist acts, but 
to label someone as being corrupt is to contend that whatever 
argument that person makes will be self-serving, disingenuous—
not to be taken at face value.  In many instances, such conclusions 
are likely warranted—there are no doubt many corrupt politicians 
who have concocted creative but entirely false arguments to justify 
their plunder.32  It may be possible, in an attempt to avoid the 
loaded moral connotations of the word, to separate individuals 
from institutions—that is, to argue that a system, process, or 
institution is corrupt or corrupting but that the individuals within 
it are not corrupt.33  Yet it seems plausible to respond that 
 
25 See generally id. at 32 (discussing how a binding court decision has narrowed 
the definition of corruption).  
26 See Coates, supra note 20, at 31–32.  
27 See generally LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, CAPTURED BY EVIL:  THE IDEA OF 
CORRUPTION IN LAW 7 (2013) (discussing one part of Laura’s argument 
surrounding corruption). 
28 See generally id. at 8 (discussing the substantive theory of corruption). 
29 See id. at 13–14. 
30 See generally id. at 139–40 (discussing corruption as a breach of duty). 
31 See generally id. at 139 (discussing and distinguishing a difference between 
illegality and corruption). 
32 See, e.g., id. at 140, 143 (discussing the notion of the corrupt politician and 
examples of such). 
33 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 140. 
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individuals within that system remain complicit in that corruption 
or that those who wish to condemn institutions but not their agents 
are naïve about the innocence of the institutional agents or their 
ability to rise above its corruption.34 
Second, virtually all of those who study corruption begin from 
the same point: that its precise definition is in dispute.35  For 
instance, Lowenstein refers to corruption as an “essentially 
contested concept” with no clear boundary.36  Johnston and 
Klitgaard both note that the definition of corruption is necessarily 
imprecise because it is culturally determined and hence varies 
from one culture to the next.37  Yet most of the literature that 
begins from such claims proceeds to document activities that any 
reasonable person would conclude are corrupt—or, at least, are bad 
things that one should avoid.38  Much of the empirical 
anticorruption research agenda addresses behaviors that are 
undoubtedly corrupt,39 and we would not question the motives of 
one who seeks to find ways to prevent, for instance, the sorts of 
widespread vote buying, bribe taking, or price fixing that are 
rampant in many political regimes.40  We have little quarrel, in 
addition, with the enterprise of identifying and quantifying the 
world’s most corrupt political regimes.41  Even without an airtight 
definition of corruption, the empirical research on these countries 
seems to us to show that they are rotten places to live.42  In some 
instances, corruption is like pornography—we know it when we see 
it.43  The sheer volume of efforts to define and redefine corruption, 
however, suggests that demarcating the boundaries of it is more 
 
34 See generally Coates, supra note 20, at 30–31 (discussing Vermont’s 
Attorney General’s decision to condemn employees and management in Vermont’s 
legal department). 
35 See MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND 
DEMOCRACY 11 (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
36 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of 
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 851 (1985). 
37 ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 3 (University of California 
Press, 1988); see JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 11. 
38 See JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 3 (describing four syndromes reflecting 
commonly found combinations of corruption). 
39 See id. at 18. 
40 See id. at 17–18.  
41 See Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
42 Id. 
43 Claire Berlinski, The Dark Figure of Corruption, HOOVER INST. (May 29, 
2009), http://www.hoover.org/research/dark-figure-corruption. 
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important than is doing so for other politically disputed terms.44 
Third, corruption is in some ways what public opinion 
researchers refer to as a “valence issue.”45  Although it is not (as 
per the first characteristic above) easily scalable (as valence issues 
such as competence, integrity, honesty, and so forth are), it is, like 
these examples, nonideological.46  No one, left or right, advocates 
for corruption.47  Despite the ambiguity of the term around the 
edges,48 there is often agreement in recognizing certain types of 
action as corrupt.49  Once a behavior can be defined as corrupt, 
political foes can join in their condemnation of it.50  In a political 
environment as polarized as that of the contemporary United 
States,51 such an opportunity is not to be taken lightly.  Although 
the two efforts we reference above originate from the political left,52 
it is important to note that corruption has been central to political 
arguments, both theoretical and practical, among American 
conservatives as well.53  A shared language regarding corruption 
poses the tantalizing possibility of a policy agenda that can avoid 
the partisan gridlock that has characterized so much of American 
politics over the past two decades.54 
 As a consequence, expanding the definition of corruption—
redefining corruption, rather than clarifying it—can, we would 
argue, be harmful.55  Much of the recent American effort of late has, 
as we shall demonstrate, sought to recast legal but distasteful (or 
degrading) activities as corrupt or corrupting.56  Such a focus risks 
 
44 See JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 11. 
45 See Donald E. Stokes, Spatial Models of Party Competition, 57 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 368, 373 (1963) (Valence issues, as articulated by Stokes, are issues where 
all voters share an ideal point; such issues include honesty, competence, or 
morality). 
46 Id. at 372–73. 
47 See id. at 372. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. at 372–73 (discussing that when evidence of malfeasance turned up 
in the Democratic Party, many voters felt the party had strayed from virtue). 
50 See id. at 372–73. 
51 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 2. 
52 See RAYMOND J. LA RAJA & BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND 
POLITICAL POLARIZATION: WHEN PURISTS PREVAIL 153 (2015). 
53 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 2; STOKES, supra note 45, at 372. 
54 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 2. 
55 See generally ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM 197–98 (2014) (discussing the lack of trust in government to 
create reform without partisan political intentions and citing to past reform 
scandals). 
56 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 11; supra note 8 and accompanying 
text. 
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politicizing the issue, thereby casting into doubt the things that 
have not been contested.57  In other words, if corruption becomes a 
matter of partisan or ideological contestation, this can render 
research into the really bad stuff suspect.58  Such an effort can also 
risk turning matters of scale (such as political contributions or 
lobbying restrictions in the political world, limitations on grant-
supported research in academia, or gift-giving and its concomitant 
attached strings in virtually every walk of life) into categorical 
issues, or turning political, ethical, or moral decisions into legal 
ones.59  We concur with Robert Mutch that much of what gets 
subsumed by contemporary American corruption talk is properly 
political;60 it reflects enduring disagreements about American 
values that cannot be adjudicated by the courts.61 
Our argument, in a nutshell is this: it is clear what those who 
discuss corruption in contemporary American politics mean.62  But 
they misuse the term: they are not, in fact, talking about 
corruption as it is commonly understood in contemporary 
America.63  And while this new meaning is clear, there are 
underlying philosophical problems with it, problems that (a) 
render the definitional attempts confused about how corruption 
within an institution works, and (b) hinder constructive discourse 
about the underlying problems that have prompted contemporary 
American “corruption talk.”64  Accordingly, in this paper we 
describe the contours of contemporary corruption talk; we 
demonstrate the novelty of such claims; and we outline our 
concerns about this talk as philosophical project and rhetorical 
tool. 
 
57 See MUTCH, supra note 55, at 198 (explaining that politicizing the issue can 
lead to dysfunction and an inability to reform). 
58 Id. (describing the risk of partisan gridlock). 
59 See id. at 197 (discussing how Bellotti and Citizens United politicized reform 
efforts and the history of economic, social, political, and cultural differences in the 
country which have maintained a fault line in our politics). 
60 See MUTCH, supra note 55, at 184. 
61 See id. 
62 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 2–3. 
63 See id. at 11; JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 18 (showing examples of the term 
corruption). 
64 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (definition problems); supra 
notes 62–63 and accompanying text (confusion); infra notes 65–68 and 
accompanying text (American corruption talk). 
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I. AMERICAN CORRUPTION TALK 
The contemporary era of “corruption talk” can be traced back to 
the Supreme Court’s Buckley v. Valeo decision,65 and to three 
distinct definitions of corruption that have dominated American 
political discourse since that time.66  While these definitions have 
been intertwined with the debate over money in politics,67 the 
stakes here and the formulation of them are somewhat larger.68  
Nonetheless, let us start with the Court. 
A. The Political Story 
In Buckley, the Supreme Court famously equated political 
spending with speech and responded to recently passed campaign 
finance legislation by declaring that the prevention of “corruption 
or the appearance of corruption”69 was the only legitimate reason 
for restrictions on such speech; it declared that other plausible 
goals, such as equality, limiting the role of money, or allowing for 
a diversity of voices were not constitutionally permissible.70  There, 
and in subsequent decisions,71 the Court went on to develop a 
definition of corruption that was limited to instances of direct quid 
pro quo corruption—that is, instances where the corrupted was an 
individual politician.72  The Court would go on, as well, to largely 
abandon its concern about the appearance of corruption.73  The 
problem here was that if we regard the public as the ultimate 
arbiter of what appears to be corrupt, then virtually any 
governmental action is suspect—surveys have shown that not only 
do most Americans (and residents of other nations, as well) believe 
politicians to be corrupt, but that no change in election regulation 
has any effect on that belief.  So there’s not much government can 
do to make itself appear less corrupt.74 
 
65 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976); MUTCH, supra note 55, at 9–10. 
66 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 163–64. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45–47 (1976) (explaining that limits on independent 
expenditures do not prevent “corruption [or] the appearance of corruption”). 
70 Id. at 19–21, 25.  
71 Id. at 246; see MUTCH, supra note 55, at 192. (discussing that Citizens United 
further narrowed the Court’s definition of corruption). 
72 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27, 246. 
73 Id. at 45. 
74 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 4–5 (discussing that laws cannot be 
made to address issues of this nature, such as cultural and emotional). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/16/2016  6:38 PM 
350 ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9 
The Court’s definition has been adopted and elaborated upon by 
anti-regulation writers such as Bradley Smith and John Samples.75  
It presents a view of a legislature not as an institution but as a 
collection of individuals; to make a claim that an institution is 
corrupt, one would have to demonstrate that many, if not all, 
members of that institution are corrupt.76  There have since this 
time been two plausible responses to Buckley:  to challenge the idea 
that corruption is what matters, or to challenge the definition of 
corruption.77  While both approaches have proven to be largely 
futile, to date, for advocates of regulation,78 there is ample history 
to suggest that the second approach has always seemed a bit more 
plausible if one’s goal is to win in the courts.79  It is not uncommon 
for the court to reject legislation but then to go on to counsel 
Congress on how it might achieve similar ends by slightly 
reframing its goals.80  Proponents of the most comprehensive post-
Buckley campaign finance legislation, the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act, did just this, making direct reference to the prevention 
of corruption and assembling a lengthy record of statements by 
political contributors on the potentially corrupting nature of their 
activities.81  There is, perhaps, something fundamentally 
disingenuous in presenting such comprehensive legislation as an 
anti-corruption measure, but the court’s rules were clear.82 
The so-called “new corruption” arguments that were presented 
in the 1980s and 1990s in the legal community, sought to present 
an alternate understanding of corruption that allowed for 
 
75 See JOHN C. SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 65–66 
(University of Chicago Press 2006); BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY 
OF CAMPAIGN 123 (Princeton University Press 2001). 
76 SMITH, supra note 75, at 215 (discussing corruption of a system which allows 
law makers to determine who can spend money, and how much). 
77 See id. at 123 (breakdown of the Court’s Buckley ruling demonstrating its 
implications and reactions to the ruling). 
78 See generally id. at 18, 20 (giving a brief history of campaign spending, 
regulation, and reform during a time that corruption was not seen to be a threat, 
discussing an act which prevented abuse of power by elected officials but which 
was not created until nearly the 20th century). 
79 See generally id. at 18, 20 (creating an act through Congress creates 
regulations which could be upheld or struck down by the Court in creating a 
definition or standard for corruption). 
80 See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 589–90 (2000) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (the Court rejected California’s blanket primary law yet instructed 
the state on how to write a new, constitutionally permissible law that essentially 
created the same system).  
81 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132–33 (2003). 
82 See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 589–90 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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prophylactic measures—efforts to prevent harm to an institution 
itself by making it clear that suspect individual transactions are 
prohibited.83  Under this understanding of corruption, proof of a 
quid pro quo transaction is not required;84 if the practices of an 
institution are deemed by the public to be corrupt, then this is 
ample reason to take steps to prevent them from happening.85  
Instances of quid pro quo corruption can still be identified and 
punished, but laws that remove the temptation to engage in such 
corruption86—laws that, for instance, limit contacts between 
legislators and lobbyists or limit unregulated contributions87—can 
be implemented without proof that corruption has occurred as a 
result of such actions or would occur in the absence of regulation.88  
Many prophylactic measures of this nature have been quite 
popular with the public.89  In Citizens United, however, the court 
held that “influence, gratitude, or access” are not equivalent to 
corruption in the sense they hold to be relevant for limiting 
political speech through independent expenditures.90  As long as no 
explicit agreement has been made between the spender and the 
politician, this is not corrupt.  This holding has established an 
almost insurmountable barrier for those who would allege 
corruption in campaign financing.91  At the same time, more easily 
identifiable instances of individual corruption have shown that the 
obvious examples of individual corruption stand far outside of 
conventional political squabbles.92 
B. Bigger than Politics 
So much for the legal story about corruption in campaign 
finance.  American discussions about corruption have never just 
 
83 See IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING 
MONEY IN POLITICS 182–83 (Joshua E. Rosenkranz ed., 1999) [hereinafter IF 
BUCKLEY FELL]. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 183–84. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 184. 
88 Id. 
89 See IF BUCKLEY FELL, supra note 83, at 95. 
90 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 355–59 (2010). 
91 See id. 
92 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT XII (2012) (debating that the academic view of 
corruption showcases the danger in a light not easily identifiable while the 
activist creates extremes that are not always relevant to politics but instead truly 
individual) [hereinafter REPUBLIC, LOST]. 
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been about electoral politics, and in the past several years a 
growing number of writers on the left (mostly) and the right have 
sought to articulate a broader argument about corruption.93  While 
the Court may have inspired some of this, one might contend that 
the Court is no longer the intended audience of this discussion.94  
And although the principals in this discussion have mostly been 
law professors, the argument is hardly a legal one.  It has sought 
to tap into larger American concerns—it is not merely that our 
politicians might be beholden to lobbyists or wealthy donors, it is 
that Americans have become increasingly disenchanted with 
politics,95 that America’s standing on a variety of cross-national 
indicators of well-being has fallen, and that our government seems 
less capable of addressing problems today that it was in prior 
decades.96  Might this because of “corruption” in a more epic sense?  
Or its consequence? 
It seems to us that there are currently three different theories of 
corruption on the loose in American politics.97  None of these is that 
of the Court;98 although the Court perhaps instigated the 
corruption debate, its definition is sufficiently minimalist that 
there have been few serious efforts to elaborate upon it.99 
The most prominent theory of corruption today is associated 
with Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig, who has sought to 
articulate a theory of what he alternately refers to as institutional 
corruption, or “dependence corruption.”100  Whereas individual 
corruption, for Lessig, is essentially a quid pro quo exchange in 
which a public official seeks some sort of personal benefit in 
exchange for provision of a private benefit to someone outside of 
government, institutional corruption occurs when a system tends 
to promote private interests due to influence, rather than deals.101  
Institutional corruption is characterized by improper 
 
93 See SMITH, supra note 75, at 123 (discussing how the Court has denied a 
broader definition of corruption while implying this would be a topic worth 
discussion).  See generally SAMPLES, supra note 75, at 257 (discussing how 
corruption can be in politics even if not involved in the election process). 
94 See IF BUCKLEY FELL, supra note 83, at 68–69 (explaining legislative ideas 
for campaign financing reform). 
95 See supra notes 3–5, 10–14 and accompanying text. 
96 Id. 
97 See IF BUCKLEY FELL, supra note 83, at 182–84. 
98 See id. 
99 Id. (implying that the categories within the article were created because of 
the lack of clarity and intrusiveness into the matter by the Court). 
100 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 16–17. 
101 Id. at 15–17. 
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dependence.102  That is, contemporary social science might predict 
that self-interested politicians seek to stay in office, and in doing 
so they provide benefits to voters or blocs of voters.103  There is 
nothing noble in this, but if we believe that votes are a means of 
ensuring accountability and that winning votes is a way of seeking 
the common good, this may not seem corrupt.104  The institution is 
working as it is supposed to.105  If, on the other hand, government 
officials are dependent upon something other than votes—
“funders,” perhaps106—for their well-being, and are providing 
benefits to them rather than to voters, then the institution is not 
dependent in the manner that we expect it to be.107  The institution 
is corrupt, regardless of the culpability of individual members in 
corrupt deals.108  Individual politicians might all regret this 
occurrence, and they might even speak out against it, but they 
nonetheless will need to cater to donors rather than voters 
(perhaps viewing themselves as better or more ethical than those 
who might replace them).109  An institution can be corrupt, for 
Lessig, when its members are influenced improperly, even if we 
cannot punish individual members for corrupt deals.110 
Lessig has openly drawn upon the work of Dennis Thompson, 
but there is a crucial difference.111  In his early work on Ethics in 
Congress, Thompson sought to distinguish between individual 
corruption, in which a legislator exchanged favor for personal 
benefit, and institutional corruption, in which a legislator 
exchanged favors for political benefit.112  Thompson argued that 
 
102 Id. at 17. 
103 See generally id. at 15–16 (illustrating allegorically how a doctor’s decision-
making may be compromised through receipt of benefits and implying similar 
results would occur in the case of a politician). 
104 See id. at 16 (illustrating the choices made by doctors and a conception of 
corruption). 
105 See id. at 16–17. 
106 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 16–18 (arguing that if the benefits 
received alter the official to be concerned with only the gift providers well being, 
then the corruption is not the level of dependency expected). 
107 Id. at 15–18. 
108 Id. at 15. 
109 Id. at 15–16. 
110 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 15–16 (explaining that the influence 
on a member of an institution may result in the corruption of the institution 
without the individual actually being corrupt and therefore not liable for 
punishment). 
111 See id. at 328. 
112 See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO 
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 7 (1995). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/16/2016  6:38 PM 
354 ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9 
institutional corruption is ultimately more difficult to identify and 
prosecute, insofar as it often does not yield corrupt results and is 
not always easily distinguishable from accepted behavior.113  He 
insists, however, that instances of institutional corruption are 
individual acts that are “mediated” by the practices of the 
institution.114  Institutional corruption may bring the norms and 
practices of the institution into question, but for Thompson, it is 
ultimately an action of individuals (whom he lists in an appendix 
to his book).115  Lessig, on the other hand, although he reiterates 
Thompson’s distinction, emphasizes that he does not wish to single 
out individuals.116  It is the institution of Congress, itself, that is 
corrupt.117  In Republic, Lost, he writes that 
This corruption has two elements, each of which feeds the other.  
The first element is bad governance, which means simply that our 
government doesn’t track the expressed will of the people . . . . The 
second element is lost trust: when democracy seems a charade, we 
lose faith in its process.118 
It is hard to imagine listing the perpetrators of this corruption—
which is much of Lessig’s point. 
The turn in Lessig’s story is necessary because he is not talking 
only about Congress, and he is not talking only to the Court.119  He 
is not interested in a legal case, but in fostering dialogue.120  He 
makes this explicit in his Randy L. and Melvin R. Berlin Family 
Lectures, delivered in 2014 and 2015, at the University of 
Chicago.121  There, he summarizes much of the research he and 
others pursued at the Safra Center, where he served as the director 
 
113 Id. at 7–8. 
114 See id. at 7 (describing the ways in which corrupt political institutions can 
be regulated by members’ actions). 
115 Id. at 7–8, 182–90. 
116 See Lawrence Lessig, Institutional Corruptions 5–6, 15 (Edmond J. Safra 
Research Lab at Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 1, 2013)[hereinafter Lessig, 
Institutional Corruptions]. 
117 Id. at 4, 15. 
118 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 8–9. 
119 See id. at 227–28 (discussing both legislative and judiciary powers to 
prevent and deal with corruption). 
120 See id. (discussing the way corruption can be dealt with through the 
branches of government, and the powers required to effectively deal with it). 
121 See Video: Lawrence Lessig, America: Compromised Studies in Institutional 
Corruption, RANDY L. & MELVIN R. BERLIN FAMILY LECTURES AT THE UNIVERSITY 
OF CHICAGO (Oct. 16–Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://berlinfamilylectures.uchicago.edu/2014-lawrence-lessig [hereinafter 
Berlin]. 
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from 1987 to 2009.122  He proposes a definition of corruption as 
“influence within an economy of influence that illegitimately 
weakens the effectiveness of an institution, especially by 
weakening the public trust of the institution.”123  Whatever one 
thinks of the specifics of this definition (and we will consider these 
later), the intent here is clear—it can be applied, as Lessig proceeds 
to do, to a variety of different types of institutions, including the 
academy, the financial industry, and the media.124  There is no 
pretense that we are telling the Supreme Court who is corrupt; the 
intention, rather, is to develop a unified theory.125  Lessig clearly 
does document, both here and in the Safra Center work, a variety 
of ills that have befallen these institutions.126  Yet, as with 
government, the extent to which these ills constitute “corruption” 
according to this definition is determined by the appropriate 
dependency relationship or purpose.127 
The other principal articulator of this expanded theory of 
corruption has been Fordham University law professor Zephyr 
Teachout.128  In Corruption in America, Teachout connects 
contemporary disputes over money in politics to the historical 
treatment of corruption in American political thought.129  Like 
Lessig, she argues for a more expansive, extra-legal view of 
corruption,130 but unlike Lessig, she explicitly locates this view in 
most references to corruption in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century American thought.131  Teachout notes that American 
“corruption talk” has historically had to do with the perversion of 
discourse that might occur, for instance, if foreign interests were 
 
122 Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption 2 (Edmond J. Safra 
Center for Ethics at Harvard University) (Working Paper No. 16, 2013); see 
Berlin, supra note 121. 
123 Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2. 
124 Berlin, supra note 121. 
125 Id. 
126 See Berlin, supra note 121; Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 
116, at 4. 
127 See Berlin, supra note 121; Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 
116, at 17. 
128 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 2 (Harvard University Press, 2014); 
Zephyr Teachout, FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/23186/zephyr_teachout (last visited Mar. 29, 
2016). 
129 TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 2–4 (explaining that the historical fear of 
monetary corruption is the same that exists in contemporary politics). 
130 See id. at 3–4. 
131 See id. at 2–3, 14. 
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able to insert themselves into American politics.132  The corruption 
inherent here is one of duplicity,133 in that the influences behind a 
particular argument would not be known, and, as in Lessig’s case, 
one of improper dependency.134  While Teachout distinguishes 
corruption from dependency,135 she concludes that improper 
dependency can lead to corruption (of an institution or of a 
people),136 and that one solution to this is “bright line” prophylactic 
laws, which both deter corrupt behavior and send a clear signal 
about the “moral weight” of the law itself.137 
For both Lessig and Teachout, (but not for Thompson) defining 
corruption and establishing a dichotomous view of corruption—
either it is an individual or an institutional trait—is crucial.138  
Neither disputes that individual, i.e., venal or quid pro quo, 
corruption exists,139 but both emphasize that that is not what they 
are talking about—and moreover, in Teachout’s case, that that is 
not what the Founders were talking about.140  Teachout’s more 
historical approach to corruption calls our attention to differences 
between contemporary corruption talk and the American reference 
points we often use in that talk,141 but it is, like Lessig’s book, very 
much an attempt to reintroduce and expand the concept in 
contemporary politics.142  It is important to note that in this latter 
 
132 Id. at 3–4 (explaining that corruption through diplomats would allow 
foreign interests to enter into and potentially disrupt the American political 
system). 
133 Id. at 15–16 (explaining the different sides of Franklin’s beliefs and the 
corruption possible). 
134 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 17; TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 15–16 
(illustrating how the example of Jefferson keeping the diamonds showcases a 
dependency on a foreign government unknown to Congress). 
135 See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 16, 45 (describing how there 
was a fear of corruption through dependency as well as a fear of general 
corruption created through foreign interests). 
136 See generally id. at 15–16, 45 (explaining the possibility that one who 
become dependent on foreign interests will create a corrupt institution to continue 
receiving benefits from that interest). 
137 Id. at 184. 
138 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 14; see Berlin, supra note 121, at 5. 
139 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 7, 10; see Berlin, supra note 121, at 5 
(clearly stating the dichotomy of corruption).  
140 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 10 (discussing the history of corruption 
in politics from the ratification of the Constitution). 
141 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 18 (discussing the reason behind a 
portion of the Constitution); TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 38, 39 (explaining that 
the way in which corruption was described during the creation of the nation bears 
similar comparisons at times to remarks made in current political debates). 
142 See LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST supra note 92, at 18; TEACHOUT, supra note 128, 
at 38, 39 (explaining that the description of corruption during the Founders time 
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regard, Lessig and Teachout (both of whom have a long track 
record of advocacy for left-leaning Democratic candidates)143 have 
actively sought out areas of agreement with conservative writers 
such as Jay Cost and Peter Schweizer.144  As Teachout, in 
particular, shows, the left in no way owns the idea that political 
institutions can be corrupted.145 
A second opposing theory of corruption is offered by Cornell Law 
Professor, Laura Underkuffler.146  In Captured by Evil, 
Underkuffler provides a survey of definitions of corruption in 
theoretical and empirical research.147  She concludes that 
references to corruption virtually always are used to make moral 
judgments about an individual’s character.148  It is a moral, 
 
still matches to the public thought of corruption in today’s world). 
143 Brian Tumulty, Zephyr Teachout will Run in 19th Congressional District, 
POUGHKEEPSIE J. (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/story/news/local/new-
york/2016/01/25/zephyr-teachout-running-congress-19th-cd/79302000/ (reporting 
that Teachout is an active member of the Democratic political party and currently 
running for a Congressional seat); Alan Rappeport, Lawrence Lessig’s Presidential 
Bid Endures in Relative Obscurity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2015, at A17, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/us/politics/lawrence-lessigs-presidential-bid-
endures-in-relative-obscurity.html (reporting that Lessig intended to run as a 
Democrat in the 2016 presidential election). 
144 See JAY COST, A REPUBLIC NO MORE: BIG GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL CORRUPTION xi-xii (2015) (explaining the premise of the book, 
in that corruption exists within governmental institutions and elected officials); 
PETER SCHWEIZER, CLINTON CASH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW AND WHY FOREIGN 
GOVERNMENTS AND BUSINESSES HELPED MAKE BILL AND HILLARY RICH 2–3, 17 
(2015) (describing the way in which the Clinton family has amassed their fortune 
as questionably corrupt given the possible abuse of power); TEACHOUT, supra note 
128, at 14–16 (describing generally the layout of the book and the way in which 
the topic of corruption will be discussed which is politically neutral given the 
historical framing); Lawrence Lessig, Democrats Embrace the Logic of Citizens 




145 TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 14–16 (describing corruption in general, and 
the history of political corruption in the U.S. was in no way controlled or tempered 
by one party or another, but rather by all, citing James Madison, Ben Franklin, 
and Thomas Jefferson and their thoughts on corruption, given the historical 
viewpoint of the book). 
146 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 5; Faculty, CORNELL LAW SCH., 
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio_laura_underkuffler.cfm (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2016); supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
147 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 2. 
148 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 2; supra notes 2–34 and accompanying 
text. 
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dispositional concept, and as such is unsuitable for use in law.149  
One cannot commit a corrupt act without being a corrupt person.150  
The moral taint associated with corruption suggests that one is 
unsuited to engage in politics or public life at all—one’s actions 
simply cannot be trusted.151  Such corruption certainly exists, but 
for Underkuffler the accusation of corruption must be used 
sparingly.152  If corruption implies “evil,” one is effectively 
banishing one’s antagonist from the political sphere when one 
levels the accusation.153  Furthermore, the institutional argument 
runs into problems here: can an institution be evil, or captured by 
evil?154  Is it possible to sustain an individual/institutional 
distinction where one effectively argues “the institution is evil but 
its members are not”?155  Underkuffler does not provide any 
conclusive evidence that she is right (or that Lessig is wrong),156 
but her argument at a minimum provides enough historical detail 
to convince that the connotations of talking about corruption are 
at odds with Lessig’s task and render that task problematic.157  
Underkuffler’s notion of individual corruption requires no quid or 
quo;158 there are people who would engage in quid pro quo 
corruption, but it does not matter if they actually have.159  There 
are, furthermore, people who engaged in minor instances of 
individual corruption but have revealed themselves as the sort of 
people who would do far worse if they could get away with it.160 
A third theoretical approach to corruption is presented in the 
work of Bruce Cain and Nancy Rosenblum.161  Neither Cain nor 
 
149 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 3–5 (describing how a moral subject can 
not easily be explained or regulated through law). 
150 See id. (explaining that a corrupt act can be seen as evil, and an evil act can 
therefore only be done by an evil person, a corrupt person will perform a corrupt 
act and thus the inverse is true). 
151 See id. at 4, 6 (discussing how a corrupt official can not be trusted to serve 
in their positions). 
152 See id. at 4–5 (describing why corrupt is not the proper description given 
the various moral issues which can be created by its usage). 
153 See generally REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 5–6 (noting how 
progressives at the turn of the century attacked political entities they saw as 
being corrupt). 
154 See generally id. at 15–16 (proposing that if one doctor is corrupt that the 
whole institution of medicine is not). 
155 Id. at 15.  
156 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 212. 
157 See id. at 7. 
158 See supra notes 146–52 and accompanying text. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 168; see also NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE 
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Rosenblum bill their efforts as being exclusively about corruption, 
and neither disputes the notion that there is a difference between 
institutional and individual corruption.162  Both share a broader 
theoretical orientation which Cain identifies as “reform 
pluralis[m].”163  In Cain’s argument, however, there are in fact a 
number of different ways to talk about corruption.164  There is room 
for talk of a “corruption of democratic ideals” (which is what he 
takes Lessig to be talking about),165 there is room for talk of 
inappropriate dependence (which is what Lessig takes himself to 
be discussing)166 and there is also room for talk of a corruption as a 
“debasement of public deliberation”167 in which self-serving 
arguments are deceptively framed as appeals to public ideals.168  
Likewise, Rosenblum catalogs the various ways in which 
“corruption” is used as an umbrella term to cover “implicit 
understandings, ambiguous favors, and political advantage.”169  At 
some point the definition of corruption may be expanded to the 
point of meaninglessness.  This is a problem because the audience 
for corruption talk maintains the sort of “gut” response to the word 
that Underkuffler describes.170 
Cain’s argument is also taken up by La Raja and Schaffner in 
their argument for strengthening the capacity of political parties 
to influence elections.171  For La Raja and Schaffner, there is a 
trade-off to be made between addressing corruption and 
addressing political polarization; one cannot do both, and given the 
ambiguity of the term corruption, it can be applied to all manner 
of political ills.172  The anticorruption agenda, however, has focused 
so narrowly on the allegedly corrosive effect of money in politics 
that it has crowded out concerns such as “fairness, stability, and 
accountability,”173 concerns that are not easily reconciled with 
 
OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP 172 (2008). 
162 CAIN, supra note 6, at 168; ROSENBLUM, supra note 161, at 172. 
163 CAIN, supra note 6, at 168–69. 





169 ROSENBLUM, supra note 161, at 212. 
170 See generally UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 144 (noting that the 
emotional reaction to a politician’s corrupt acts may be toward the idea of the 
politician’s corruption rather than to the act itself). 
171 See LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 52, at 152. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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existing campaign finance regulation proposals.174  Even if the 
court does not see these as legitimate reasons to abridge 
constitutional rights, they can still serve as rationales for some 
types of laws, and they are, in addition, valid starting points for 
political conversation.175 
Unlike Underkuffler, and like Lessig, however, a pluralist 
theory of corruption would admit that political actors are, at least 
in part, self-interested—and if that alone can constitute 
corruption, then it might be plausible to argue that we are all a 
little bit corrupt.176  Cain and Rosenblum both prescribe 
aggregation as a means of combatting corruption;177 the premier 
aggregative institutions in American politics are, and always have 
been, political parties and reputation-bearing interest groups.178  
Given the priors we bring to any discussion of corruption, it is hard 
to talk about institutional corruption if one is a pluralist; one 
cannot describe political parties or interest groups as corrupt and 
then suggest that these things be strengthened.179  The same would 
seem to apply to arguments about other allegedly corrupt 
institutions—if the institution is corrupt, why should it be 
strengthened or why would enhancing intermediate institutions be 
an appropriate palliative? 
There is a perhaps unintentional irony to the development of 
recent arguments about corruption.  As Teachout notes, and as 
Wallis documents, the story about corruption propounded by moral 
reformers during the nineteenth century was the one most likely 
to emphasize institutional or systemic corruption—it posited an 
uncorrupted American ideal rooted in the founding, in Christian 
values, or in the agrarian, antebellum American ideal, and 
presented early 20th century America, with political machines and 
vote-seeking career politicians as a corruption of that ideal.180  The 
 
174 Id. at 153. 
175 See id. 
176 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 122; ROSENBLUM, supra note 161, at 252. 
177 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 168; ROSENBLUM, supra note 161, at 299. 
178 That is, well-known groups that expect to remain active across multiple 
elections.  See CAIN, supra note 6, at 168–69 (noting that reform movements would 
have been better off aggregating their contributions within the established 
political parties or large political action committees (“PACs”)); Robert G. 
Boatright, Campaign Finance Law and Functional Differentiation among 
Nonparty Groups in the United States, in THE DEREGULATORY MOMENT? 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CHANGING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 71, 99–101 
(Robert G. Boatright ed., forthcoming 2016).  
179 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 168.  
180 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128; John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of 
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Progressive argument about corruption may have been inspired by 
similar circumstances, but took aim at individual politicians and 
posited prophylactic measures—primary elections, the Australian 
ballot, and so forth—as means of preventing individual 
corruption.181  In some ways the contemporary alignment has 
matters backwards; it is self-styled modern progressives (with a 
small “p”) who have championed the nineteenth century 
conservative view,182 albeit without as clear a reference point, and 
it is today’s conservatives who have argued that individual 
corruption is the major subject of concern (with the caveat the 
prophylactic measures have been shown not to work very well).183 
To summarize, the contemporary discussion about corruption 
can be understood in part as a response to the U.S. Supreme 
Court,184 but it represents an acknowledgment that the Court is not 
listening, and that the appropriate audience is someone else – the 
legal advocates of tomorrow, members of the opposing party, or 
simply the public.185  It is easy to conclude that the institutional 
corruption argument championed by Lessig is “winning”—it has 
frequently been written about,186 it prompted a presidential 
campaign,187 and it has the clearest political implications,188 and yet 
its implications are not reflexively partisan in nature.189  But this 
facility is, for those who articulate opposing views, precisely the 
problem.190  The fact that this definition does not appear to “fit” our 
priors about what corruption is (even if the Supreme Court’s 
definition does not, either) and the fact that it purports to be a 
redefinition or at least a rediscovery of a lost word suggests that 
this thing, however lamentable, that many people today are calling 
 
Systematic Corruption in American History, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS 
FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 32, 50–55 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia 
Goldin eds., 2006). 
181 See TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 180; Wallis, supra note 175, at 52–54. 
182 See generally TEACHOUT, supra note 128, at 9 (noting that “an act is corrupt 
when private interests trump public ones in the exercise of public power”). 
183 See generally id. at 7 (noting that both Justices Kennedy and Roberts, in 
separate opinions, determined that corruption was only quid pro quo). 
184 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 4142–43 (1976).  
185 See supra text and accompanying notes 65–178. 
186 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 92, at 15–16. 
187 See id. at 4; see also LESSIG, https://lessig2016.us/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2016) 
(Democratic Presidential Campaign).  
188 See id. at 7–9. 
189 See generally id. at 7 (noting Lessig’s intent as being to rally Republicans 
and Democrats against a corrupt system). 
190 See LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 52, at 153 (noting the difference 
between the Democratic and Republican parties’ views on campaign finance). 
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corruption is not, in fact, corruption.191 
II. CONFUSIONS 
We contend—and we have explained this contention at length 
elsewhere—that in virtually all political, moral, and religious 
definitions of corruption, there is a broad agreement that corrupt 
action shows a turning away of the agent from his proper ends or 
function, for the sake of serving other, often lower and more selfish, 
goods (e.g., money, power, honor) or a partial interest rather than 
a common good.192  This general framework can encompass a wide 
variety of actions, but ultimately it is not the action itself that is of 
principal concern.  Although the legal category targets,193 as it 
must, particular criminal acts, the reason citizens take single acts 
of criminal corruption so seriously is that we see them as 
indications of something less isolated and more damaging.194  The 
guilt of criminal corruption has the psychological and political 
effect of covering the person categorically and permanently:195  the 
person is stained.  Thus, a single action, though the legal target, is 
not primarily the social concern when an accusation of corruption 
is made.196  Rather, the corrupt act is taken as a symptom of the 
corruption of the person.197  An inward truth about the agent has 
pierced through his public show: the particular act of turning away 
indicates a condition, an established character, consisting in the 
agent’s perhaps habitual orientation toward these other interests, 
proving the agent a false or at least undependable servant of his 
proper ends.198  It is the process of turning away that precedes the 
 
191 See M.E. Newhouse, Institutional Corruption: A Fiduciary Theory, 23 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 554–55, 594 (2013) (discussing the various 
definitions and interpretations of institutional corruption and the impacts made 
on the political system). 
192 See JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 11; Robert G. Boatright & Molly B. Flynn, 
Confusions and Disagreements about the Rotten in Politics, in CORRUPTION AND 
GOVERNMENTAL LEGITIMACY: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE (Jonathan 
Mendilow & Ilan Peleg eds., forthcoming 2016) (galleries on file with author). 
193 See Political Corruption, FBI.GOV, https://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/corruption (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
194 See generally JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 11 (discussing how the social 
significance of corruption is cultural and public opinion of corruption can affect 
the definition in a way which views the corrupt act as more serious). 
195 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 55. 
196 See id. at 55–56 (demonstrating Spiro Agnew’s demise as a bribe-taker was 
far worse than his committing a felony, based on the public’s perception as a flaw 
in his humanity). 
197 See id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
198 See id. 
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particular action that is of most importance.199 
In this, we largely agree with Underkuffler:  the accusation 
suggests the person is wholly untrustworthy with important 
matters, because his character has been captured, if not by evil, 
then by baser interests.200  We likewise agree with her that this 
point is not properly converted into a new legal definition:  we 
cannot wish to criminalize dispositions, however corrupt.201  The 
broader definition does, however, shed light on why we are 
bothered by acts that appear somewhat like corrupt actions even 
when they are not, and should not be, legally categorized as such.202  
They reveal the action we cannot directly observe, the turning 
away.203 
This conception of corruption—as a turning away from the 
public good toward something else, throws into relief a central area 
of confusion in contemporary corruption talk:204  what sense does it 
make to say that an institution, but not its members, turn away 
from its proper good, toward something else? 
A. The Parts and the Whole 
There are three different additive issues posited among 
institutional corruption claims.  First, contemporary American 
“corruption talk,” especially that of legal theorists, political 
scientists, and other elite commentators, is dominated by the 
attempt to apply the idea of corruption to further domains and 
practices.205  So corruption definitions (such as Lessig’s claim above 
regarding corruption as “influence”)206 are said to be further 
illuminated when applied across multiple domains.207  Second, it 
has recently become common to see arguments that an institution 
can be corrupt even when none of its members are corrupt.208  And 
third, it has also become common to see references to some 
 
199 See id. 
200 See id. at 68. 
201 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 69. 
202 See generally id. at 72 (noting the powerful visceral impact of labelling 
something corrupt and the relative ease with which this is done). 
203 See id. 
204 See id. at 139 (distinguishing evil conduct from corrupt conduct by 
highlighting that corruption “threatens the entire governmental system of 
reliance, trust, and shared values of which [a politician] is part.”). 
205 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 28–29. 
206 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
207 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 28–29. 
208 See id. at 17. 
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imagined “tipping point” at which institutions become corrupt—
that is, if just one or two members are corrupt, they are 
aberrations, but if enough members are, the entire institution is 
compromised.209  How do we make sense of these various claims?  
One way to think about these matters is to think about the notion 
of corruption as a “turning.”210 
Examples from Multiple Domains:  One intriguing feature of 
some recent corruption arguments is their taking examples from 
multiple, non-political domains.211  The question here is whether 
we get additional leverage on the concept or consequences of 
corruption by exploring multiple different instances.212  This is not 
a novel observation.213  As Plato shows in the Euthyphro, providing 
multiple instances that are said to be examples of a larger concept 
(there, it is holiness or piety) does not bring one closer to a 
definition of the thing itself214 (or, as Catherine Zuckert puts 
matters, “knowledge is not simply analytic nor synthetic”).215  We 
might be able to rule out particular things, but we cannot be 
certain that we have a large enough taxonomy to draw conclusions 
about the thing itself or about all instances that are examples of 
the thing. 
Many of the examples of undue influence that Lessig and others 
provide are indeed cringe-worthy.216  But enumerating examples 
(as helpful as this may be in spurring thought about definitions) is 
not the same as defining.217  Being bothered is different from 
understanding.218  There very well may be valid descriptive reasons 
to enumerate and classify incidences of corruption in different 
domains;219 this is a major task in much of the empirical literature 
on corruption,220 and it can tell us things such as whether country 
 
209 See generally id. at 18 (providing an example of a point where 
democratically elected officials are unduly influenced by outside benefit). 
210 Id. at 16–17 (discussing the way in which one corrupt person does not create 
a corrupt institution, but rather this could be the turning point in which the 
corruption takes hold). 
211 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 28–29. 
212 Id. 
213 See, e.g., CATHERINE H. ZUCKERT, PLATO’S PHILOSOPHERS: THE COHERENCE 
OF THE DIALOGUES 639–40 (2009). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 635. 
216 See, e.g., REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 15–16. 
217 Id. at 17, 18. 
218 See id. 
219 See generally id. at 28–29 (recounting an experiment attempting to classify 
what corruption is in the domains of “politics, medicine, and consumer products.”). 
220 See id. 
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A has experienced more instances of corruption than country B.221  
This would seem to be useful in a sheerly practical sense:  where 
would one wish to live?  Where would one wish to engage in 
philanthropic efforts?  Yet if the corruption itself involves a turning 
from the public good, it seems irrelevant where the turning took 
place.222  A corrupt banker is functionally the same as a corrupt 
politician, as a corrupt university administrator.  The corruption 
took place before the action.  Now it may be of interest that 
corruption is more common in some domains than others,223 but if 
so, we have shifted our conversation to one about the 
circumstances under which individuals might become corrupt.  We 
have neither clarified the definition nor have we absolved these 
individuals. 
Indeed, it is not merely officials who can be turned away from 
their proper purposes, and it is not merely by committing a 
criminal act that an agent can evidence a distorted orientation by 
which he, operating as an official, values lower and private goods 
over higher and common goods.224  If we adopt the view common in 
the philosophical literature on our natural human tendency 
toward corruption, perhaps we are all potentially corrupt225—but 
we might only act upon that inclination in certain circumstances, 
within certain institutional frameworks.226  Yet this does not make 
these frameworks themselves corrupt.  Despite examples offered 
from multiple domains,227 we are left with the question of whether 
the concept of institutional corruption makes sense. 
Corrupt Institutions full of Uncorrupted People?:  Another classic 
matter in separating types of corruption is what one might call the 
 
221 See generally BO ROTHSTEIN, THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT: CORRUPTION, 
SOCIAL TRUST, AND INEQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (The 
University of Chicago Press 2011) (detailing and comparing how corruption affects 
water access in several different countries). 
222 See JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 68 (detailing allegations of corruption by 
various politicians at different periods of time and under diverse circumstances). 
223 See, e.g., Peter Rodriguez et al., Three Lenses on the Multinational 
Enterprise: Politics, Corruption, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 37 J. OF 
INT’L BUS. STUDIES 733, 739 (2006) (noting that “[c]orruption is quite common in 
government procurement, in the provision of infrastructure services, and in 
business licensing[,]” for example). 
224 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 68. 
225 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 15–16; UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 
27, at 68. 
226 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 15–16 (noting how a doctor might be 
corrupted in the context of recommending pharmaceuticals based on benefits 
received from a pharmaceutical company). 
227 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 28–29. 
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“McConnell Paradox.”228  During the debate over what was then 
known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill, 
Senator Mitch McConnell took issue with the claim that the bill 
would combat corruption.229  “How can there be corruption if no one 
is corrupt?”  McConnell asked, “That’s like saying the gang is 
corrupt but none of the gangsters are.”230  While this rhetorical 
trope is not original to Senator McConnell,231 it has served as an 
effective riposte for those who would challenge regulation of any 
activity that tended toward corruption.232  As Thompson has 
shown, it can be rhetorically effective in some circumstances to 
personify what he, Lessig, and others have described as 
institutional corruption, but in other circumstances the response 
to the McConnell paradox has been to repeat their definition and 
to emphasize that institutional corruption does not implicate 
individuals.233   
The difference here may in part be a semantic one.  If corruption 
is represented as a “turning” then it seems only individuals can be 
corrupt.234  Institutions cannot turn.235  They can be turned, but if 
this is the case one might argue that they have been corrupted, not 
that they are corrupt.236  In other words, there has to be some 
personal agency here somewhere.237  A group of persons can have a 
will, and may constitute itself in a manner that establishes 
institutions to do their will or seek their good.238  Some might argue, 
with Rousseau, however, that any institution that is not strictly 
 
228 See Lawrence Lessig, Congress Can Be Corrupt Without Corrupt People, 
THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 13, 2013, 5:45 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/13/congress-can-be-corrupt-
without-corrupt-people.html. 
229 See Alison Mitchell, Republicans Pillory McCain in Debate Over Soft Money, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/15/us/republicans-
pillory-mccain-in-debate-over-soft-money.html. 
230 Id. 
231 See id.  
232 See generally Lessig, Congress Can Be Corrupt Without Corrupt People, 
supra note 228 (noting how a particular advocacy group has launched political 
advertisements in line with McConnell’s philosophy against a politician they 
believe to be corrupt). 
233 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 5–6; Lessig, 
Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 3. 
234 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 68. 
235 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 5–6.  
236 See id. at 15–16 (emphasis added). 
237 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 6. 
238 See generally Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 16 
(providing an example of how medical institutions prioritize the demands of their 
industry in limiting transparency and accountability). 
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acting on orders from the people who have constituted it, which has 
deviated from its purpose whether by an individual’s nefarious 
designs or through inattention of the people, has been corrupted.239  
But, if so, it has still been corrupted through the actions of 
individuals.240  Properly speaking, there are not really agentively 
independent institutions at all in social contract theories such as 
Rousseau’s.241  Nor do such institutions exist in contemporary 
rational choice literature;242 when motives are attributed to groups 
of people, they are almost always attributed not to institutions but 
to organizations, deliberately constituted by individuals to 
facilitate deliberation and pursue common ends.243   
This may be why references to institutional corruption are 
scarce in the older political philosophy literature.244  It is much 
more common to see references to the corruption of a people.245  If 
one wishes to excuse individuals, this may be a more accurate 
approach.246  We can become corrupt without necessarily being 
aware of it; in fact, if all of us become corrupt together, then we 
may be too compromised to see the corruption in others.247  When 
Machiavelli, for instance, presents instances of corrupt peoples, it 
is perhaps easy for the modern reader to envision a world 
constituted of tiny principalities, some of which have the bad 
fortune to be made up of thoroughly rotten individuals.248  Yet, it is 
 
239 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 15, 18 (Roger G. 
Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., Bedford St. Martins 1978) (1762). 
240 See id. at 15. 
241 See Edward W. Younkins, Rousseau’s “General Will” and Well-ordered 
Society, LE QUEBECIOS LIBRE (July 15, 2005), 
http://www.quebecoislibre.org/05/050715-16.htm.  
242 See Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder, Congress and American Democracy: 
Institutions and Performance, in INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY XIX, XX 
(Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005).  
243 See, e.g., Jack Knight, Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing 
Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 95, 96 (Jack Knight & Itai Sened eds., 1995); Douglas C. North, Five 
Propositions about Social Change, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 15, 15–18, 
20 (Jack Night & Itai Sened eds., 1995); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, 
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF 
CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 5, 10 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 
1995); DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT 15 (1995); Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder, supra 
note 242, at xx. 
244 CORRUPTION, EXPANDING THE FOCUS 8 (Manuhuia Barcham et al. eds., 
Australian National University Press 2012). 
245 Id. 
246 See, e.g., id. at 68–69. 
247 See, e.g., id. 
248 See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 3–28, 35, 42, 
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harder to imagine similarly implicating a modern nation of over 
300 million people, especially when the imaginer is one of the 300 
million.  But perhaps this is a possibility that would be more 
consistent with the manner in which the term was used in the 
classic literature.249 
This corruption of a people may not, however, be what Lessig 
wishes to talk about.  Lessig’s definition makes frequent reference 
to replacing criminal quid pro quo with a certain type of 
influence.250  We would suggest, rather, that his definition confuses 
corruption for influence.251  While an honest politician will indeed 
avoid any quid pro quo agreements, no politician can avoid 
influence, indeed, multiple influences from myriad sources.252  He 
may turn away from his proper purposes in response to a bad 
influence, but that does not make influence itself corruption: it 
would make the individual agent corrupt.253  Indeed, Lessig’s 
definition nods to this fact by specifying the corrupting influence 
as occurring within “an economy of influence.”254  The phrase 
implies that politicians, and other institutional agents, operate 
within systems of people creating and trading influences.255  In her 
discussion of parties and corruption, Nancy Rosenblum comments, 
aptly, “[n]othing is more elusive than influence (except ‘undue’).”256  
Lessig’s definition gets caught on this point.257  The influences his 
definition labels as corrupting, the influences which allegedly 
entwine politicians in institutional corruption, are those that 
“weaken the effectiveness of the institution.”258  This specification 
does not do much to reduce the elusiveness of what counts as 
improper influence, since this leaves the difficult empirical task of 
determining the conditions under which an institution operates 
most effectively.259  (For example, the definition implies that public 
trust is required for the proper functioning of these institutions:  
but what amount of public trust of the institution allows it to 
 
49, 55 (Max Lerner trans., 1950) (providing examples of corruption). 
249 See id.; CORRUPTION, supra note 244, at 8. 
250 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2, 15. 
251 See supra notes 101–10 and accompanying text. 
252 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 15. 
253 Contra id. at 2. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. 
256 Rosenblum, supra note 161, at 246. 
257 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2. 
258 Id. 
259 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 5. 
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function most effectively?260  What degree of public distrust, or 
trust, hinders it?  Mustn’t the institutional corruption theorists 
believe some distrust will help our institutions operate more 
effectively, or else they themselves would be damaging these 
institutions?)261  
Distinguishing between those influences that enhance and those 
that hamper an institution’s effectiveness requires us to face, even 
beyond the empirical difficulties, the deeper, and philosophically 
prior, difficulty of understanding the purpose of the institution in 
question.262  This difficulty is philosophically prior because it is only 
in light of these proper purposes that the notion of an institution’s 
“effectiveness” gains any meaning at all.263  It follows from our 
above claims that institutions are not corrupt except insofar as 
they are corrupted by individual agents;264 and if this happens 
under corrupting influences, we are still left to ponder which 
influences help and which hinder the individuals in serving the 
institution’s proper ends.265  
Corrupt Practices, or, the Theseus’s Ship Problem:  Before 
turning directly to the matter of institutional purposes, let us 
consider a weaker variant of the McConnell paradox:266  while 
perhaps the institution cannot be corrupted without its members 
being corrupt, is it possible for it to be corrupted without all of them 
being so?  Perhaps one or two corrupt individuals may not be 
symptomatic of a corrupt institution, but once the number of 
demonstrably corrupt individuals reaches a certain level, we might 
then start describing the institution itself as being corrupt.  This 
is a convenient and common shorthand.  For instance, Democratic 
politicians characterized the Republican-led Congress as being 
“the most corrupt Congress in history” in the run-up to the 2006 
election.267  Did they mean that the institution was corrupt, or was 
this merely a way of saying that a large number of individual 
politicians were corrupt?  Most likely (especially since these words 
 
260 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2; Thompson, Two 
Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 5–6. 
261 See id. 
262 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 4–5. 
263 See id. at 5. 
264 See id.  
265 See id.  
266 See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
267 See Thomas Edsall, Republicans Say Mollohan Should Quit Ethics Post, 
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/07/AR2006040701800.html. 
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were spoken by fellow members of the Congress who did not 
radically alter Congressional rules or practices when they gained 
control)268 it was the latter.   
If I purchase a bag of grapes, and one of them is rotten, I can 
easily remove that grape and eat the others.  There comes some 
point, however, when I have gone through the bag finding rotten 
grapes, that I give up and discard the bag, concluding that the lot 
of them is rotten.  Perhaps I do not mean that they all are, only 
that the effort it would take to find a fresh one is not worth it.  It 
is a matter of the degree of precision I have in my description.  This 
is another classic problem in philosophy, of nobler origin than the 
McConnell paradox: the Theseus’s ship problem (described by 
Plutarch) or the Heraclitean claim, presented in Plato’s Cratylus, 
that a person can never step in the same river twice.269  At what 
point does change in the parts constitute a transformation of the 
whole?  The parallel here is that we cannot with precision identify 
a point at which individual parts can corrupt the whole, although 
even a small number of parts change the character of it.270  A 
further parallel, in modern terminology, might be made to 
computer parts; we say that a computer drive has become 
corrupted when only a small part of it fails to work properly.  A 
problem with one small part can destroy the whole. 
This variant view of institutional corruption may be more 
promising than claiming that an institution can be corrupted 
without its members being so.  One broken plank on a ship cannot 
break another plank.  Rot can, however, spread from one piece of 
fruit to another if the two are next to each other.  This may be a 
more accurate way of thinking about institutional corruption.271  
One corrupt individual amongst a body of the uncorrupt may be 
cast out.  If the corrupt proliferate in number past a certain point, 
however, they may influence the practices of the group.272 
To see why this is so, we must distinguish between singly 
corrupt acts or persons and corruption as a practice.273  In fact, one 
 
268 See generally id. (discussing how Republican House leaders charged that 
the GOP has fostered a “culture of corruption”). 
269 See THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 421, 439 (Edith Hamilton & 
Huntington Cairns eds., 1961)[hereinafter PLATO]; Plutarch, Theseus, THE 
INTERNET CLASSICS ARCHIVE (1994–2009), 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/theseus.html. 
270 See PLATO, supra note 269, at 423; Plutarch, Theseus, supra note 269.  
271 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 116, at 15–16. 
272 See id. 
273 See id. at 17 (discussing the different effects of each type of corruption, 
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reason citizens worry about corruption scandals, in addition to 
whatever injustice they directly sow, is their power to “cause 
scandal” in the older sense.274  Contemporary theorists of 
corruption are quite concerned with the fact that corrupt actions 
and agents damage the people’s faith in their government.275  A 
citizen’s moderate skepticism about government and governmental 
officials is, however, healthy.276  Distinct from this concern is the 
worry that singly corrupt actions and individually corrupt agents 
encourage others in like positions to act as they have acted, to 
become like them.277  Corruption displayed is corrupting.278  
There are two levels at which the corrupting power of corruption 
can operate.279  First, human beings are often inspired to act 
according to the models they witness.280  The corrupt agent sets up 
a model for any others who witness the corruption, whether this 
behavior be publicly known or not, whether it be taken by a witness 
as exceptional or as a practice involving multiple individuals.281  
Thus an infectious tendency belongs to corruption, as to all human 
behaviors.282  A corrupt individual corrupts other individuals.283  
Second, a corrupt pattern corrupts the norm.  Human beings act 
always in a milieu of socially established norms.284  The witness 
may take the corrupt action or agent as presenting a social norm, 
as indicating “how things are done.”285  When this presentation is 
more or less accurate, corruption has become not just an 
 
individual and institutional). 
274 See, e.g., Paul Wadell, The Dangerous Power of a Scandalous Life, THE 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 14, 1997), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-09-
14/news/9709140300_1_mother-teresa-scandal-goodness.  
275 See, e.g., REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 9; Thompson, Two Concepts of 
Corruption, supra note 116, at 15–16.  
276 See generally, Kevin Williamson, Defining ‘Corruption’ Corruptly, NAT’L 
REVIEW (May 9, 2015, 3:04 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/418158/defining-corruption-corruptly-
kevin-d-williamson (discussing the inevitability of moral corruptions). 
277 See THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS PT. 
II 520–21 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1917) (1485).  
278 See id.  See generally Williamson, supra note 272 (discussing public officials’ 
use of corruption talk to perpetuate “corruption writ large” without crossing the 
line into “legally actionable corruption”).  
279 See infra notes 280–85.  
280 See Jong-sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality 
and Corruption, 70 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 136, 140 (2005). 
281 See id.  
282 Id. 
283 See id. 
284 See id.   
285 Id. 
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exceptional single action and possibly contagious, but customary 
and epidemic.286  This presentation of a pattern of corruption 
involving many individuals is more powerfully corrupting, more 
scandalous, than are scattered corrupt individuals.287  One must 
make oneself an exception not to participate; failing to go along 
with the pattern may seem either supererogatory or naïve.288  
If we take the corrupt act or behavior as “how things are done,” 
what is the social rule by which we judge the violation as a 
violation?289  In the case of individual corruption in a healthy 
system, the corrupt action or agent is recognized as exceptional, 
whereas in the case of corruption-as-a-practice, the individually 
corrupt action or agent is seen as normal (average), and the norm 
itself is seen as exceptional though still operative as norm, 
operative in thought insofar as we recognize corruption as 
corrupt.290  In such a case, there must be two simultaneous and 
conflicting set of social rules, where one is inherently parasitic on 
the other.291  It is an unstable situation, threatening the survival of 
the official norm.292  For those still in possession of the higher norm, 
who still recognize corruption even when it has become established 
practice, the situation asks for the return of the true and rightful 
king, the restoration of the legal order.293  
What happens if the official norm is totally lost?  Individual 
corruption and corruption as a practice must therefore be 
distinguished from a third type, namely corruption as loss of the 
ideal, in which society no longer honors the normatively primary 
“official” institution on which corruption as practice is parasitic, 
 
286 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 17 (quoting 
Charles “Buddy” Roemer as saying “It’s the system that’s corrupt. . . . People 
within the system can’t imagine the system functioning any other way.”). 
287 See id. 
288 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 124. 
289 See, e.g., You & Khagram, supra note 280, at 140. 
290 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 124; You & Khagram, supra note 280, 
at 140.  See generally Rod Blagojevich, Former Illinois Governor, Sentenced to 14 
Years on Corruption Charges, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rod-blagojevich-former-illinois-
governor-sentenced-to-14-years-on-corruption-
charges/2011/12/07/gIQA1tAHdO_story.html (reporting a former politician’s 
conviction and sentencing for corruption charges). 
291 See Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, at 14. 
292 See id. 
293 See generally Maarten de Jong et al., Eliminating Corruption in Our 
Engineering/Construction Industry, 9 LEADERSHIP & MANAGEMENT IN 
ENGINEERING 105, 108 (July 2009) (calling for changes in the construction 
industry as part of an effort to combat perceived corruption). 
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such that bribery, etc., is not only “the way things are done,” but is 
considered—from the viewpoint of socially established rules—the 
way things are properly done.  It is no longer seen as corrupt.294  
B. The Need for an Ideal (or, What’s a Heaven For?) 
All of this brings us to the question of what, in fact, institutions 
are.  Lessig’s definition of corruption requires that we identify in 
advance for any institution what its purposes are and which 
sources and degrees of influence on its agents are helpful for these 
purposes and which are not.295  Similarly, the framework we have 
posited here presumes that there is a public purpose in which we 
are engaged; we have constructed institutional, public roles and 
assigned them certain functions that are different, and differently 
understood, than our personal desires and tasks, and these public 
roles make sense as serving goods of the institutions of which the 
roles are, by definition, subservient.296 
These functions can serve as an ideal—they are constructs to 
which we attach rules (both formal and informal), responsibilities, 
and expectations.297  These roles are what Searle refers to as a 
“status function.”298  Consider, for instance, the role of “senator.”  If 
an individual politician has turned away from doing what a 
senator should do, we might (with Thompson)299 identify this as a 
particular type of corruption (a type that Thompson, as we have 
noted above, identifies as institutional corruption, but which is 
distinct from claiming that the larger institution, such as 
Congress, is corrupt).300  This claim can only be made, however, if 
we have an ideal of what a “senator” should be and do.  But this is 
different from saying that the institution is corrupt.   
 
294 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 124; You & Khagram, supra note 280, 
at 140.  Perhaps one might say it no longer is corrupt.  To conceive of the social 
norms themselves as corrupt requires appeal to some other norm viewed as a 
higher or more fundamental norm—a more supreme social norm or a norm not 
socially recognized at all.  See LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 124. 
295 See Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, at 2; Thompson, supra 
note 122, at 4–5, 7 n.7.  But see Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, 
at 7, 16.  
296 See generally Thompson, supra note 122, at 4–5, 7 n.7 (explaining that if a 
public figure is dependent on anything other than “the people” it is corruption).  
But see Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, at 7, 16. 
297 See generally John R. Searle, What is an Institution?, 1 J. INST. ECON. 1, 7 
(2005). 
298 See id.  
299 See Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 6, 18. 
300 Id. 
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In this sense, the institutional role in question is that of the 
“senator.”  Yet one can only be a senator within a larger institution, 
such as (obviously) the Senate (again, a point made by Searle).301  
And the Senate, in turn, is also comprised of a set of rules, 
responsibilities, and norms.302  In one sense, it is these that 
constitute the institution of the Senate; in another sense (following 
from our point above regarding rational choice theorists’ 
distinctions between organizations and institutions),303 the Senate 
is an organization, a body of 100 people.  And what are we really 
talking about if we say that the Senate is ‘corrupt’?  We would 
contend that corruption of the group has clear, public meaning, 
while corruption of the institution apart from the group is far 
trickier, lacking a clear, public meaning.  The rules exist for a 
purpose (which may be good or bad), but they are in themselves 
value-neutral.304  We can only talk about their corruption if we 
specify a purpose behind the rules, responsibilities, and norms, and 
then discuss their failures to conduce to that purpose.  If the rules 
are inadequate to enable the people to achieve that purpose, we 
might talk about improper fit.  If the members, on the other hand, 
have flouted the rules, then we might allege corruption at the 
individual level.  
Influence and Dependence:  Lessig claims that we can skirt the 
purposes argument about Congress by simply recognizing the 
“improper dependency” of Congressional campaign procedures on 
donors,305 where the dependency is recognized as improper because 
the dependency was supposed to be, according to Madison in 
Federalist #52, “the people alone.”306 
This is questionable as a descriptive claim, as the quotation from 
Federalist #52 is taken out of context.  Madison is there 
emphasizing that the House of Representatives was not to be 
dependent upon the state legislatures.307  We are reminded that 
there is a much more mundane sense in which the House is 
 
301 See generally Searle, supra note 297, at 10–11 (explaining that subgroups 
and roles within subgroups can exists within larger groups, using families as an 
example). 
302 Rules and Procedure, UNITED STATES SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Rules_and_Procedure
_vrd.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
303 Supra note 243 and accompanying text.  
304 See Rules and Procedure, supra note 302.  
305 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 245. 
306 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 483 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press 1945). 
307 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 483 (James Madison). 
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dependent upon the people alone:  its members were (prior to the 
17th amendment) the only officials of the federal government 
directly elected, rather than elected or appointed by other 
officials.308  We do not need to like the influence of donors upon 
elections; still, we should recognize as controversial rather than as 
obvious, Lessig’s argument that members of Congress should not 
rely on citizen donations in their campaigns.309  Lessig’s example 
therefore fails to show that we can identify improper influence 
without appealing to purposes of an institution.310 
Two points about this project undermine, we contend, the 
helpfulness of Lessig’s definition of corruption.  First, while 
improper influence is meant to be illuminated by the purposes of 
our public institutions, those purposes are often just as elusive and 
contested as the idea of undue influence.311  Thus, ultimately, the 
definition of institutional corruption is un-illuminating outside a 
discussion of these institutional purposes.312  Second, governmental 
institutions in our democratic republic seem designed to respond 
to this human situation of un-clarity about ultimate purposes of 
our most important institutions.313  They do this by allowing— 
within a constitutional framework that imposes limits as well as 
creating places for debate and decision—the play of influences in 
the country to determine the particular purposes to be sought.314  
This we call politics.315  Thus, ultimately, the definition of 
institutional corruption seems either to shortchange, or simply 
challenge, the constitutional system as a framework for politics, 
 
308 See The People of the People’s House, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, U. S. HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).   
309 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 157. 
310 See generally id. (the primary method of campaign finance being through 
corporate donations in the hopes of influencing outcomes, which requires a 
corrupt institution because the individuals are corrupted in their use of power 
within the institution). 
311 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 8–9, 15–16 (demonstrating how 
corruption should be easily identifiable within a public institution given the 
purpose of the institutions existence, however it can be blurred or unclear to the 
public eye whether a wrong has been done); Lessig, Institutional Corruption, 
supra note 116, at 8–9; Thompson, supra note 122, at 5. 
312 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 19–20 (demonstrating, for example, 
that receiving gifts from the Crown corrupted members of Parliament because it 
pulled their focus from the good of the people and towards the good of the king); 
Lessig, Institutional Corruption, supra note 116, at 14–15. 
313 See generally REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 19 (explaining that the 
Constitution was framed in a way which was believed to alleviate the corruption 
of foreign powers). 
314 See Thompson, supra note 122, at 5–6.  
315 See id. 
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which is supposed to involve contesting opinions or “influences.”316  
These two points fit together in an important way:  it is by 
having discussions of purposes within the framework that the 
framework is best maintained.317  That is to say, our being a 
political community is constituted in discussions in which we, 
especially through our intermural disagreements, define what 
these purposes are.318  And this is not a once and for all affair:  we 
continue to constitute ourselves as a political community as we 
recontest our various consensuses and deliberate about how to 
apply our vaguely and imperfectly agreed upon purposes in new 
situations.319  
Thus, the proper response to Lessig’s definition of institutional 
corruption is, we believe, a call to further discuss together the 
purposes of our institutions.320  There is certainly nothing wrong 
with such discussions.  Yet we fear that broad acceptance of 
Lessig’s definition of institutional corruption would hinder this 
discussion in two ways:  first, the definition purports to be able to 
diagnose a major problem of our institutions without our needing 
to dirty ourselves with the more fundamental discussion of 
purposes;321 second, it uses a term with powerful criminal 
connotations to describe politics and its inevitable play of 
influences, thus threatening to cast out of the discussion those who 
disagree about the purpose of the institution, just as we cast out 
from political life officials caught taking bribes.322  
Institutions, then, seem insufficiently powerful to be said to be 
corrupt.323  They may fail, they may not fit our needs, they may not 
be updated to account for changing circumstances, they may be 
subverted by individuals pursuing their own private interests, or 
 
316 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 2; Thompson, Two 
Concepts of Corruption, supra note 122, at 6. 
317 See Thompson, supra note 122, at 5–6; see also Lessig, Institutional 
Corruptions, supra note 116, at 8 (noting that identifying when a tendency 
becomes institutional corruption, one must identify a baseline). 
318 See Thompson, supra note 122, at 5–6; see also Lessig, Institutional 
Corruptions, supra note 116, at 7–8 (discussing the types of corruption that are 
done within the political community and the purposes they serve). 
319 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 7–8. 
320 See id. at 2. 
321 See id. at 16, 19. 
322 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 226–27 (clear corruption within an 
institution on the most basic level can threaten the discussion of institutional 
corruption). 
323 See generally id. at 17 (demonstrating that because of the reliance on 
individuals, the institution itself is not corrupted given the power is with 
individuals and their actions within the institution). 
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they may calcify, becoming overly complex or opaque.324  They can 
be turned away.325  But they have no agency—they cannot turn 
without someone turning them, either through malice, sloth, or 
self-interest.326  If we want to talk about this, we cannot separate 
institutions from individuals, groups of individuals, or people.327  It 
is they who may be corrupt in such instances.328  And yet, if we 
want to make a secondary point—that an institution has been 
corrupted, we can only do this by positing an ideal from which that 
institution has been turned—an idealized institution up to which 
we hold our actual ones.329  Perhaps this means that the actual will 
always fail to match the ideal, but at the least we might be able to 
talk about the distance between the two.330 
This, finally, poses a problem for discourse.  What we are saying 
is that any claim about institutional corruption is a regime 
argument:  an argument about what purpose our association 
should serve, what the common good is.331  Thus, allegations of 
institutional corruption seem to be reduced to accusing other 
people of disagreeing with us about the common good.332  It would 
be better for us simply to say so, and to admit the ideals we are 
asserting.  We are holding the individuals in, say, the Senate, up 
against our idealized notion of what the Senate is supposed to be: 
a concept of “the Senate” which may have existed at some point in 
time, may have been articulated in the Constitution or the 
Federalist Papers, or may exist in the popular imagination (say, as 
 
324 See generally ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1130–31 (Richard 
McKeon ed., Random House 1968) (1941) (discussing how a household is the basic 
form of a political institution and the way in which circumstances can alter within 
a household, be it a possession becoming something capable of action or an actor 
failing to produce). 
325 See id. 
326 See id.  
327 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 16–17 (showing how institutional 
corruption sometimes cannot be separated from individual corruption given that 
people are what make the institution corrupt). 
328 Id. 
329 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 8 (noting that 
identifying when a tendency becomes institutional corruption, one must identify 
a baseline). 
330 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 278 (discussing how even within a 
party the ideal and reality can vary). 
331 See Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing 
Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1395–96, 1421–22 (2013) (arguing that 
corruption cannot be precisely defined by the court without also developing a 
theory of representative democracy—a theory which is beyond the scope of the 
court’s powers). 
332 See id. at 1392. 
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a consequence of watching Mr. Smith Goes to Washington).333  Or, 
to take matters a step further, we may, with Quirk and Binder, 
prefer to hold as an ideal a loosely defined good and be flexible 
about the institutional features that will be necessary to achieve 
that.334  But, it is this construction in language and public discourse 
that drives our debate.  We need to talk about what this regime 
looks like.  
And if we don’t all share this ideal or norm?  If, for instance, one 
person’s “Senate” is a sacrosanct constitutional treasure, while for 
others it is a reminder of slavery and undemocratic privilege?  How 
do we proceed?  For Thompson, we can still find common ground 
by stating our acceptance of procedures—that is, we might reach a 
grudging acceptance that we will, at least, allow majority rule or 
some other decision rule serve as the institutional means of cutting 
short our regime argument.335  But this acceptance is not 
necessarily facilitated by branding a person, or a person’s 
practices, or even the organization to which one belongs, as 
corrupt.336 
At this point in the analysis of institutions it seems that to allege 
that an institution, in the proper sense, is corrupt is either to argue 
that it has been corrupted, by individuals who are themselves at 
least agents of corruption, that it is entirely too broad (a shorthand 
for categorizing things that one does not care for), or that it is 
without meaning at all, simply an epithet to toss at one’s foes.   
One final point on this matter:  one might respond to our 
argument by noting that we have inserted one academic definition 
(that of “institutions”) and branded it the “correct” one, and used 
that to brand another academic definition (of “institutional 
corruption”) as “wrong.”337  This is not our intent here.  Language 
changes over time.338  It is beyond our means here to address the 
question of why language changes (whether naturally or through 
deliberate decisions by individuals), but we do not mean to suggest 
 
333 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010); see also Hellman, 
supra note 331, at 1394 (noting that what we see as corruption of legislators 
depends on what we believe to be proper “decisionmaking [sic] by elected 
officials”). 
334 See Quirk & Binder, supra note 242, at 527. 
335 See Thompson, Ethics in Congress, supra note 112, at 28. 
336 See generally id. (noting that the main difference between corruption and 
public purpose is whether private interests, regardless of whether they are those 
of individuals, contentious factions, or mass movements, bypass democratic 
processes). 
337 See supra notes 123–27, 309–310 and accompanying text. 
338 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
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that one cannot redefine a term.339  We mean, instead, to note that 
if this is the task, it should be owned up to, and the reason for that 
task—the end—should also be specified. 
III. WHAT’S THE HARM? 
The above discussion documents a very broad political agenda—
one that goes far beyond the initial impetus for this effort, the 
Supreme Court’s skeptical approach toward regulating political 
contributions.340  There are many valid reasons for Americans to 
consider changes in our campaign finance laws, and one of us has 
written frequently in support of various reform proposals.341  Many 
of Lessig’s proposals, when shorn of their “corruption” 
framework,342 are welcome additions to our political discussion.  
The question is not whether we should have a serious discussion 
about reform, but rather what sort of frame we should use in that 
discussion.  As we have sought to document above, we find the 
“corruption” frame to be problematic as a theoretical premise.  In 
addition to its theoretical problems, however, we also find the 
“corruption” frame to be objectionable rhetorically; the problems 
with the rhetoric of corruption derive from the theoretical problems 
outlined above. 
First, an accusation of corruption seems to impugn the whole 
person in a way that undermines dialogue.343  As we have shown, 
corruption is not an easily scalable concept; contrary to Lessig’s 
claims, it is difficult to claim that being “a little bit corrupt” is a 
sustainable equilibrium.344  It is also difficult to sustain the 
individual vs. institutional dichotomy; even if we know what the 
 
339 See JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN 
CIVILIZATION 104 (2010) (“One sees the role of the vocabulary in the activities of 
revolutionary and reformist movements.  They try to get hold of the vocabulary 
in order to alter the system of status functions. . . . [W]e get away with it to the 
extent that we can get other people to accept it.”).  
340 See ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, POLITICAL ADVERTISING VOUCHERS FOR 
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES: WHAT DIFFERENCE COULD THEY MAKE? 23 (2005) 
(discussing the ways in which the court has broached the subject of campaign 
reform); see also supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.   
341 See, e.g., BOATRIGHT, supra note 340, at 23; Robert G. Boatright & Michael 
J. Malbin, Political Contribution Tax Credits and Citizen Participation, 33 AM. 
POL. RES. 787, 788–89 (2005) (discussing a study on tax credits and the political 
interest and contribution gathered through their use).  The other author of this 
paper is skeptical of these proposals. 
342 See, e.g., Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 6. 
343 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 27, at 4–6. 
344 See Lessig, Institutional Corruptions, supra note 116, at 4, 15, 19. 
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articulators of institutional corruption theories want to say, they 
are still not actually saying it; we bring our prior understandings 
of corruption to the table.345  These two problems make allegations 
of corruption problematic in maintaining civility of political 
discourse.346  One cannot expect an individual who has been 
accused of corruption or of being a participant in an allegedly 
corrupt institution to be an eager partner in a sincere discussion of 
alternatives.347  
Second, since this rhetoric assumes but does not articulate our 
differences about the functions of our institution, we risk 
exacerbating polarization and diminishing our ability to 
understand opposing viewpoints.348  We have argued that claims 
about corruption succeed only if there is a shared reference point—
an example, real or symbolic, of an uncorrupted institution. If there 
is no such shared starting point, then those making claims about 
corruption effectively talk past each other.349  
Third, with a much broadened concept of corruption thrown 
around in public rhetoric, we run into the ‘boy who cried wolf’ 
problem.350  In his earlier work, Thompson recognized this.351  He 
describes the manner in which corruption allegations became a 
political tool in the waning days of the Democratic Party’s forty-
year long rule in the House of Representatives.352  Both sides, he 
argues, took part in a “cycle of accusation” in which each accused 
the other of corruption.353  As a result of this, he claims, the charges 
lost their moral authority, and it became difficult to separate 
individual from institutional corruption and major ethical 
violations from minor ones.354  It is easy to see this taking place 
now, outside of Congress.355  A big theory of corruption, especially 
 
345 See id. at 4–6 (defining individual and institutional corruption by focusing 
on what one would gain by way of the corrupt conduct, yet still not defining what 
corruption is).  
346 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48 (noting how each 
side of the aisle trades corruption allegations for political purposes). 
347 See generally id. (noting how accusations of ethical violation lead Congress 
to stop taking such charges seriously). 
348 See id. 
349 See REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at xii. 
350 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. at 47–48. 
353 Id. at 48. 
354 Id. 
355 See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 6, at 42; Erik Schmeltzer, Yes, the Tone of the 
Sanders Campaign Matters, and Yes, It’s Too Ugly, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 
4, 2016, 9:03 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-schmeltzer/yes-the-tone-
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one that seems to implicate all of us, can make identifying the 
egregious cases difficult, and can force everyone to choose sides.356  
One might argue that talking about corruption can, in limited 
doses, be helpful.357  As Cain writes, allegations of corruption can 
be an effective deterrent, even if they are unproven.358  Political 
candidates may shy away from questionable activities not because 
they fear legal sanction but because just being accused of being 
corrupt may harm them.359  But if everyone is calling everyone else 
corrupt, the charge may be less effective.360 
And fourth, it draws us into calling for solutions out of 
proportion to the problems.  When taken away from the individual 
context, in which the meaning of the accusation can be pinned 
down to particular events and agents, claims about corruption 
often become “epic” in nature.361  One line of thought (drawn from 
Montesquieu and Rousseau) holds that corruption is a virtually 
unstoppable process.362  This may or may not be true.  It is, 
however, a process that seems much larger than day-to-day 
politics.363  Many of the “solutions” that tend to be proposed, 
however, seem rather small in nature.364  Lessig recognizes this.365  
He closes Republic, Lost with a mixture of conventional and quite 
radical proposals—starting with clean elections, overturning 
Citizens United, having more primary challenges, and a call for the 
president to demand substantial Congressional reform,366 and from 
 
of-the-sande_b_9601978.html.   
356 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48; see also CAIN, 
supra note 6, at 42 (noting that pressures from the press and political 
organizations make accusations of impropriety a divisive and effective weapon). 
357 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48 (noting that 
when talk of corruption is pervasive, it can damage institutions like Congress).  
358 CAIN, supra note 6, at 42  
359 See generally id. (noting that “[a]llegations of impropriety can have more 
political value than truth, especially in hotly contested situations.”). 
360 THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48. 
361 See id. 
362 See JOSE MARI MARAVALL & ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 47 (2003). 
363 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
364 See, e.g., REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 250. 
365 See id. 
366 Id. at 272, 276, 285.  The precise proposal here is difficult to summarize 
succinctly.  Lessig proposes a “regent president” who will take office and refuse to 
sign any legislation until Congress radically reforms itself.  This proposal is not 
entirely dissimilar to the concept of ethics tribunals, or having an outside 
organization enforce anti-corruption standards upon an institutionally corrupt 
body that is unable to do so itself.  One might even trace this idea to Rousseau’s 
description in the Social Contract of tribunals.  Id. at 288; THOMPSON, ETHICS IN 
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there moving on to calling for a new constitutional convention.367  
It seems that one must pick sides:  On the one hand, if we truly 
have a crisis of epic, institutional corruption, then the dramatic 
solutions should, as in Rousseau, be embraced.368  We do not 
endorse this idea, but it seems like the logical conclusion from a 
larger theory and tipping point rhetoric.  On the other hand, if we 
have something smaller, more manageable, perhaps we can be 
more polite and talk about adjusting the mechanics.369  But it seems 
hard to advocate both.  Moreover, if the rhetoric has been used for 
the purpose of alleging that other institutions are also riddled with 
this new, broader sense of corruption, we might need to advocate 
similar proposals for radical change in many other areas.370  Should 
we refound the academy, or the banking industry?  The lack of 
radical suggestions for these other areas undermines the claim 
that this is a comprehensive, and not merely a political, theory.371  
Moreover, accusations of amorphous widespread “institutional” 
corruption not tied to individual agency seem to become epic and 
trap us into advocating unhelpfully epic responses.372 
Despite the problems we have always had in defining it, the 
concept of corruption has a long and rich history.  There are, in 
addition, many similarly useful terms and frames that have been 
presented in looking at the role of money and self-interest in 
politics.373  “Corrosion,” “distortion,” “influence,” and other terms 
have been used without either the scalability problems, the 
individual/institutional problems, or the pretense that a grand 
theory or epic accusation is being developed.374  There is no reason 
not to continue to employ such terms.  Veteran campaign finance 
lawyer Robert Bauer has written about the unprecedented nature 
of contemporary campaign expenditures and the novel role of large 
campaign donors, while at the same time making it clear that 
 
CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 131. 
367 REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 92, at 293. 
368 See id. at 305 (showing the expansive challenges posed by taking on 
institutional corruption and strategies to attack it). 
369 Although as Cain notes, it can become hard in such circumstances to 
separate reforms that aim to reduce corruption from reforms that just seem like 
good ideas.  See CAIN, supra note 6 at 7, 40. 
370 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 162–63. 
371 See generally MUTCH, supra note 55, at 165 (reporting that observers have 
noted Wall Street’s increased influence on elections). 
372 See THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS, supra note 112, at 48. 
373 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 18–19. 
374 Id. 
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“corruption” has nothing to do with his description.375  As we have 
seen, Mutch, La Raja and Schaffner, and Cain also take up this 
basic point; there is much one might object to in contemporary 
politics, but that does not make those things corrupt; subsuming 
them under that rubric cheapens the term.376  Whether one agrees 
with the sentiments of these pieces or not, whether the language 
chosen in them was adopted with the same concerns in mind that 
we have, they show that we can have a heated discussion about 
what American politics and our public purpose more broadly 
should be without distorting—some might say corrupting—our 




375 See Robert Bauer, The New Donors, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Apr. 15, 
2015), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2015/04/new-donor/. 
376 See CAIN, supra note 6, at 163; LA RAJA & SCHAFFNER, supra note 52, at 152; 
MUTCH, supra note 55, at 184, 193. 
377 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371–72 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 142–44 (1976) (We say “men” here because the Buckley and Citizens United 
majorities included no women; so presumably the female members of the Court 
do not need convincing). 
